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I. Introduction
The state's limited water supply is, for all intents and
purposes, fully appropriated, and yet there are large and
growing unmet needs in all sectors, particularly in drier
years. A functional water market, if we can stimulate it, has
unique potential to reallocate these scarce supplies to max-
imize their social value in a manner that is efficient and
acceptable to the current rights holders. The Model Water
Transfer Act (Model Act) is the latest in a series of recent
proposals to reform the state laws governing the market
transfer of water and water rights in California, a state
where transfers are more debated than consummated due
to a7 plethora of obstacles. Transfers are more difficult in
California than in other jurisdictions due to a number of
unique circumstances. Developed water supplies are domi-
nated by the two large public projects, the federal Central
Valley Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SVP).
Under these two regimes, water is distributed largely
through local district contractprs. This scheme of devel-
oped surface water is the largest source of groundwater
recharge in many areas of this state in which irrigators rely
on groundwater more than anywhere in the western recla-
mation domain. As a result, water transfers often require
approval at three levels, the local district, the Bureau of
Reclamation or the Department of Water Resources. and
the State Water Resources Control Board (Board). Thus.
they are subject to many checkpoints, rules, criteria and
inertial influences. Successful transfers across district
boundaries are rare; multi-year transfers even more rare.'
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1. For a more detailed explanation of the local, state and federal
regimes which govern market reallocations of water in California. see Brian
E. Gray. The Modern Era In CaLornti Water L , 45 H.snt;Gs LI. 249 (1994). For
a more detailed explanation of the institutional barriers which have histor-
ically inhibited a more prolific California water market, see Barton H.
Thompson. Jr.. Instlitulnal Petrspectires on Water Pft and Markets, 81 CAl.UF.
LREv. 671 (1993).
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The Model Act would make incremental
progress in lowering some of the legal hurdles to
water transfers, although it would sweep too broad-
ly in expediting the Board approval process, as dis-
cussed below. Since previous efforts have
foundered on attempting a more comprehensive set
of reforms, incremental progress may be the pru-
dent course. Yet, larger steps will eventually be
needed, in our view, to allow water transfers to
achieve their potential as a mechanism for expand-
ing the beneficial use and reallocating the limited
supply of water. In the California context, it is diffi-
cult to view state water law in isolation, fitting as it
does within a water allocation system that is domi-
nated by the CVP and its contracting districts. Thus,
federal reclamation law and the incentives that
drive local and private initiatives are as important
as state law in devising an optimal water transfer
system. Ideally, the proposal to reform state water
transfer laws would derive from a comprehensive
analysis of the critical constraints and disincen-
tives, viewed from the vantage point of the actors at
the critical decisional nodes, those who own or con-
trol the already allocated supply, those who want
access to that supply, those who are at risk when
water rights are transferred, and those in the
approval loop.
Proceeding from a global vantage point, it is
easier to discern where the state rules need to be
"tuned up" to make a comprehensive approach
work. It is also easier to see where the federal rules
are the critical constraint, and where the voluntary
initiatives may need to be fostered. These insights
would permit the proposed state law reforms to
include incentives for private initiative in further-
ance of transfers. It would also provide a source of
advice to the U.S. Congress and the partisans in the
current debate over reforms to reclamation law
regarding how the federal transfer rules could be
fashioned to produce an optimal state-federal
transfer framework. While more ambitious, describ-
ing the larger institutional framework within which
imported state laws could best operate would be a
valuable service.
It is from this vantage point that we now turn
to address particular issues raised by the Model
Act, highlight areas of special concern, and offer
suggestions on alternative solutions. In Part I1, we
begin by proposing an incentive scheme intended
to stimulate user-initiated transfers and enhance
the role and participation of water districts in the
movement of water across district boundaries. In
Part II, we focus on the special problems associat-
ed with limiting transferable water to the either
consumptively used or irretrievably lost. In Part IV,
our attention turns to the Model Act provision
which protects groundwater resources, and the
essential function it would serve particularly in
areas of critical overdraft. Part V concentrates on
the significant dangers inherent in the Model Act's
sweeping reform of the administrative approval
process. Recognizing the importance of an expe-
dited process, we offer an alternative approach
which not only streamlines transfer approvals, but
at the same time adequately safeguards environ-
mental protection. Part VI focuses on third party
economic consequences of an Eggressive water
market, and in Part VII, we promote an impact
compensation fund better designed to ameliorate
these concerns and simultaneously facilitate
transfer activity. Part Vill focuses on the Model
Act's cumulative instream flow provision, the effec-
tiveness of which could be enhanced by a simple
measure bringing greater security to voluntary flow
dedication. Finally, in Part IX, we question the pro-
priety of the severely limiting time constraints
under which the Board would be required to pro-
mulgate regulations sufficient to protect Delta
water quality standards.
II. Creating Incentives for Water and Irrigation
Districts to Facilitate Water Transfers
A key to voluntary water transfers is to encour-
age water districts to play a facilitative role. A fun-
damental impediment has been the stalemate over
the extent to which members of water districts
enjoy a transferable interest in the water allotted to
them and the extent to which other members, or the
district itself, can or should be able to constrain or
veto member initiated transfers. The issue Is
whether a member of the district holds an individ-
ual water right unencumbered by any collective
rights. In one view, district members have a legal
right to transfer their allotment outside the district.
In the view of many district managers and members,
however, water supplied by a district is like a com-
mon property resource, in that any allotment not
used by one district member reverts to the common
pool and becomes available for ol her members to
use. In fact, the internal allocatioi rules, arrange-
ments and contracts with districts.are quite vari-
able, and in many, the common property mentality
is not without a rational basis. 2
2. GREGORY A. THOMAS AND MICHELLE LEIGHTON-SCHWARTZ,
NATURAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOR
MANAGING AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE IN THE SAN JOAOUIN VALLEY:
DESIGNING A FUTURE, i16-120 (September 3), 1990) (report pre-
pared for the San Joaquin Valley Drainage Program),
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The Model Act addresses this issue in Part H by
authorizing districts to act as the transfer agent for
water made available by its members3 provided that the
governing body of the district approves. 4 In our view.
this approach is too timid. Several measures for
enhancing the role of water districts in the movement of
water across district boundaries are presented below.
The Natural Heritage Institute (NHI) has pro-
posed that incentives be provided to encourage dis-
tricts to establish water "buy back" programs in
which the distncts would offer to purchase water
back from its members at prices, amounts, and
times that respond to offers to buy received from
outside of the district. Ideally, the offers to buy and
sell would be posted on a state-wide electronic bul-
letin board, which we refer to as the "California
Water Exchange" (CWE).5 A software package for this
has already been developed for NHI's water conser-
vation project with water districts under a grant from
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. Under the Central
3. A MODEL. WAmR TRANSFER AcT Fop CAuFoRNiA Ihereinafter
MODEL AcTI § 801(b). repnnted in 4 WEms-NoRnwEsT 3 (1996).
4. Id. § 802.
5. The California Water Exchange might confer the following
structure and powers:
" The CWE could be set up without authorizing legislation by
simply creating a private, non-profit corporation. Its board of
governance might include potential buyers and sellers of water
(includingenvironmental water purchasers), representatives of
water districts such as the Association of California Water
Agencies, and agencies that own or control the conveyance
systems. it might be funded through modest service charges
paid by parties to water transfers.
" CWE would develop a computerized water transfer data base
that will match potential buyers with potential sellers. It will
be accessible by modem to permit computerized trading.
The CWE might enter into options with buyers and sellers to
lock in prices and quantities of both offers to buy and offers to sell.
It might also enter into options for conveyance capacity for water
transfers and make this available to facilitate consummated deals
on a cost-reimbursable basis. All these transactions would be sub-
iect to a modest surcharge to defray the CWE's operating costs.
" CWE will facilitate transfers but will not -occupy the field:
That is to say, parties will deal with CWE on a voluntary
basis only. Any buyer or seller would remain free to deal
separately.
" It may act as an escrow agent for transfers.
" It may receive environmental mitigation payments provided
by parties to a transfer. Such payments may make that
transfereligible for fast-track treatment by the State Water
Resources Control Board (State Board), as described below.
CWE would expend the mitigation funds as intended by the
source or as instructed by the State Board. For instance, It
might contribute the funds to the Central Valley Project
Improvement Act (CVPIA) Restoration fund, or use the
funds to purchase instream flows pursuant to recommen-
dations by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or the
California Department of Fish and Game.
if requested by the parties to a transaction (and if its costs
are defrayed by those parties) CVE may represent the trans-
action in the State Board's approval process. if approval by
Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA). all transfers
of CVP water require the approval of the Bureau of
Reclamation. 6 It would be highly desirable to have a
centralized entity to deal with the Bureau for these
approvals. The districts would set these terms to
respond to offers to buy water from the CVE or any
other entity. As provided by sections 801(b) and (c)
of the Model Act. any members decision to release
water back to her district would be wholly voluntary.7
To assure that in-distnct needs would be met
before water left the district, the buy back programs
should include a right of first refusal exercisable by
any district member at the bid price plus a pro rata
share of the costs incurred by the district in admin-
istering the program.8 The remaining buy backwater
would be available to satisfy purchase offers from
outside of the district (i.e. from the CVE). Notably,
all of this can be accomplished under existing law,9
including the buy back programs and the electronic
bulletin board.
the Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) is required, it may also
represent the parties in that proceeding. CVIE would issue
annual reports on transactions consummated and their
economic effects.
S CWE might also study and report on constraints and barn-
ers to transfers and make recommendations on how to
remove them.
6. Sez Central Valley Prolect Improvement Act Ihereinafter
CVPIAI. Pub. L No. 102-575. §§ 3405(a(1H2).1 106Stat. 4600 (1992).
7. MoDE Acr § 801(bHc),
8. However, there is an issue whether the right of first
refusal should not apply to environmental water transfers which
confer a broad public benefit that should not be subject to pre-
emption by ater users interested in purchasing the same water.
9. Recent additions to state and federal water transfer law-
seek to encourage an active water market, and many of the more
Important legislative reforms necessary to carry this forward have
already been accomplished. See gnerally Gray. supra note 1. CVPIA
section 3405(a) specifically encourages user-initiated transfers by
significantly reducing the plenary power of Central Valley Prolect
water agency contractors to block extrajurisdictional transfers.
Ste CVPIA. Pub. L No. 102-575. § 3405. 106 StaL 4600 (1992).
Moreover. section 3405(a) provides for transfers to private non-
profit organizations such as the CVE for any purpose recognized
as beneficial under applicable state law, and section
3405(a)(l)(F) gives project users a pre-emptive right of first
refusal over all transfers of project water for uses outstde the CVP
service area Id. California Water Code sections 109(a) and (b)
declare it State policy to facilitate the voluntary transfer of water
and water rights where consistent with the public welfare of the
place of export and place of import, and direct all appropriate
State agencies to provide technical assistance and identify con-
servation measures that will make additional vrater available.
CA. \V/aza CoE § 109 (West 1996). Section 481 requires the
Department of Water Resources to create and maintain a list of
entities seeking to enter Into water transfer arrangements, as well
as a list of the physical facilities which may be available to carry
out water supply transfers. Id. § 481. Section 382 authorizes local
water agencies to sell. lease, exchange, or transfer vater that is
surplus to the needs of the agency's users, and sections
1810-1814 prohibit state and local agencies from denying a bona
fide transferor of water the use of unused capacity in a water con-
veyance facility, I. §§ 382. 1810-1814.
Fd1 1996
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The buy back water could be generated through
any of the techniques that constitute "conserved
water" as defined by the Model Act, including on-
farm efficiency improvements, crop shifting or land
fallowing1 0 The district would also generate water
for transfer (or use within the district) by reducing
losses in its water delivery system (e.g., lining
canals). Some of the buy back water would be pur-
chased by other growers or agricultural districts and
would remain in the agricultural economy. However,
some buy back water would be purchased by muni-
cipal districts or for environmental purposes. With
respect to this fraction, the only potential adverse
effect on the local economy would be from reduced
agricultural production as a result of fallowing land.
Other means of generating buy back water would
not reduce agricultural production.
To address local impacts of land fallowing, dis-
tricts could institute an impact mitigation program
and impose a surcharge on water transfers out of the
district to finance it. This fee would presumably not
apply to the exercise of rights of first refusal by grow-
ers within the district, thus creating a price differential
between in-district and out-of-district transfers. This
should be legitimate as long as the assessment was in
fact used to mitigate impacts of transfers. Under this
approach, the responsibility for avoiding or mitigating
the adverse effects of water transfers on the local com-
munity would lie with the local water distncts.
All of this is theoretically achievable. What is lack-
ing is sufficient incentives for the districts to undertake
this facilitative role. NHI has proposed that districts
which develop "buy back" programs or other facilita-
10. MODEL ACT § 501.
II. Our suggestions include:
* Such programs would automatically satisfy the water con-
servation mandates of the CVPIA and the Reclamation
Reform Act.
* Districts with approved programs would be entitled to have
their determinations of -unreasonable impact" under § 3405
(a)(i)(k) of the CVPIA treated either as conclusive, with sub-
stantial deference, or with a rebuttable presumption of cor-
rectness in the Bureau's approval process. See CVPIA, Pub.
L. No. 102-575, § 3405(a)(1)(K). 106 Stat. 4600 (1992).
* Members of districts with approved plans would not have to
pay the "M & I" surcharge that the Bureau otherwise exacts
under the CVPIA when they exercise a right of first refusal
(provided the restoration fund is otherwise made whole
through, for instance, an excess profit recapture policy as
described elsewhere in this article).
* The degree of latitude and discretion accorded to the dis-
trict in the transfer approval process should obviously
depend upon how exacting the criteria are for approving
district water transfer programs. If the criteria assure that
the district will not use the "unreasonableness' determina-
tion to thwart transactions that are consistent with the
intent of the CVPiA, districts with approved programs can
be given broad latitude to manage and approve the transfer
of water out of and into the distnct.
12. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES (hereinafter DWR),
tive mechanisms that are approved by an appropriate
regulatory body should be eligible for certain rewards
or privileges. For instance, certain requirements of fed-
eral reclamation law might be regarded as satisfied in
the case of approved programs.i Similar considera-
tion should be given to benefits that might accrue
under state law. Creating such an "enabling environ-
ment" for water transfers may ultimately prove to be
more important for facilitating water transfers than the
legal reforms proposed in the Model Act.
III. The Consumptive Use Limitation, the Connection
Between Groundwater Recharge/Discharge and
Surface Water Transfers, and Avoiding Adverse
Effects on Third Parties and thet Environment
California agriculture is heavily reliant on
groundwater, which comprises some 40% of water
for this sector. 2 This is more than in any other west-
ern state.i3 In the Central Valley Project service area
south of the delta, deep percolation from surface
water allocation contributes more to groundwater
recharge than does natural runoff.' 4 CVPIA transfer
rules confine transferable water to that fraction irre-
trievably lost to subsequent beneficial usei9 and
thus render this incidental recharge water ineligible
for transfer (except in areas where the groundwater
is too saline for reuse, e.g., in the most severely
impacted of the drainage-problem areas on the
west side of the San Joaquin River).1 6 There is also a
state law presumption that only consumptive use is
sublect to transferY Yet, groundwater recharge is
nowhere specified as an authorized purpose of the
CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE, BULLETINI 160-03, at 79 (1993).
13. UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURV.Y, NATIONAL WATER
SUMMARY 1987 - WATER SUPPLY AND USE, Table 9 (1987) (summary
by State of freshwater withdrawals by source and category of use).
14. DWR, supra note 12, at 82.
15. CVPIA, Pub. L. No. 102-575, s 3405(a)(1)1), 106 Stat
4600 (1992).
16. See, FINAL REPORT OF THE SAN JOAOtUIrN VALLEY DR wcIxJ^c,
PROGRAM.i, A MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR AGRIwULPURAL SULSURFACE
DRAINAGE AND RELATED PROBLEMS ON THE WESTS DE OF THE SAN IOAQUIN
VALLEY, thereinafter FINAL REPORTI (Sept 1990) (providing a com-
prehensive study of agricultural drainage and drainage-related
problems affecting the west side of the San Joaquin Valley)
17. Califomia Water Code section 1725, that applies to tempo-
rary changes in the point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of
use, requires that transfers for a period of ore year or less involve
only the amount of water that would have been consumptively used
or stored in the absence of the proposed temporary change The
statute defines "consumptive use' as the amount of water consumed
through use by evapotranspiration, underground percobtion, or
otherwise removed from use in the downstream water supply as a
result of direct diversion. See CAL WATER CODE 1725 (West 19961. No
similar limitation applies to long-term transfers under sections 1735
and 1736, the corollary to which is that there is no exemption from
Califomia Environmental Ouality Act either 1.§ 1735-1736 This, In
conjunction with application of the "no injuri' rule, has effectively
limited transferable water in California to that consumptively used
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CVP or the SWP.18 Such rules to protect this fraction
of irrigation water applications from transfer in
effect confer upon the groundwater users a vested
right to this recharge water.
The Model Act appears to retain the rule that
only water that would otherwise have been consump-
tively used is eligible for transfer. We so infer because
approvals of transfers are made contingent upon a
finding that the transfer, be it short or long term,
would not result in significant injury to any legal user
of water, including, presumably, groundwater users,
nor unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other
instream beneficial uses.19 This "consumptive use
limitation" implicates the fundamental issue of water
transfer reform which has heretofore been given scant
attention in the debate. Yet, it defies finesse.
The rule that transferable water is limited to the
fraction consumptively used makes sense where the
water originates within the same hydrologic basin in
which it is used. Within a hydrologic unit, surface and
groundwater are unitary. Water percolating into the
groundwater can be recovered and applied once again
to the surface. But in California the state and federal
projects, which dominate the water supply system, are
designed to move water out of"basins of origin" to ser-
vice areas which are in hydrologically disconnected
basins (e.g., from the Sacramento to the San Joaquin
basin; from the San loaquin basin to Kem County; and
from the Tnnity River basin to the Sacramento basin).
Where the water is imported into a CVP or SWP service
areas, the consumptive use limitation arguably should
not apply to the transfer of this water to other users
within or outside of that service area.
The perverse effects of limiting transfers to
water that does not return to beneficial use are two-
fold. First, this criterion places a large fraction of the
developed water supply outside of the market. This
is most unfortunate, in that the primary advantage
of the -water markets is that it "unlocks" the water
supply from the shackles of the prior appropriation
doctrine which allocates water on the basis of the
sequence of acquisition in contrast to its highest
economic or social value. Second, this rule would
often exclude from transfer the very water that is
most easily salvaged without deleterious effects on
existing uses: water liberated through efficiency
improvements such as lining canals or improving
water application techniques or technologies on
the farm30 In short, the very strategies that have
been the focus of most water conservation success-
es in the state, including the Imperial lrgation
District-Municipal Water District collaboration, give
rise to water that may not be eligible for transfer. 21
This limitation on transferability is a serious deter-
rent to water transfers in California.
The consumptive use limitation is intended to
protect the sequential uses of return flow and deep
percolation. Sequential 'users" of excess imgation
applications also includes the environment.
Wetlands and springs systems sometimes depend
upon excessive irngation applications. 22 Also, in
some districts, such as Arvin Edison. surface water
deliveries are intended to benefit the members who
use groundwater as well, and these members pay
for that recharge water.23
Protecting these uses. while avoiding the ngidi-
ties associated with recognizing a universe of sub-
sidiary water right. is the challenge facing water
rights reformers. A partial solution may lie in dis-
tinguishing between the rights that can accrue to
subsidiary users of native waters, as opposed to
imported waters, and to distinguish between sec-
ondary users who pay for this water, and those who
do not. The former distinction is already recognized
in existing law. but needs to be reaffirmed and car-
ried forward into water transfers law. The California
rule appears to be that an importer of surface water
does not relinquish control of the return flow; that
is. the importer can recover the return flow irre-
spective of whether others are making use of it.24
18. A 1937 Act authonzed the Central Valley Project under
the Reclamation Act to be used -first. for river regulation,
improvement of navigation, and flood control; second, for lmga-
tion and domestic uses; and, third, for power.' Act of Aug. 26.
1937, Pub. L. No. 75-392, 50 Stat. 850 (1937). See also CVPIA, Pub
L. No. 102-575. §3402, 106 Stat. 4600 (1992); and CAL. WATM CODE
§ 10000-10011 (West 1996).
19. MODELACT § 404(a) (short-term transfers) and (b) (long-
term transfers). This presumably includes groundwater pumpers
and users of tailwater or return flow. § 404(b). See also § 502 which
provides that transfers of 'conserved- water shall not exceed the
average annual quantity of water consumed' by the transferor or
irretnevably lost to all consumptive use dunng the ten years
immediately preceding the transfer. See infra Part V for NHI's com-
ments on the Model Act's specially expedited process for 'con-
served- water.
20. The consumptive use limitation confines transfers
to water that would otherwise be lost to evaporation, tran-
spiration, or flows to saline sinks. The universe of conser-
vation techniques that would generate transferable water
Is accordingly limited to land fallowing, crop substitution.
or techniques to reduce evaporation, such as replacing
sprinklers with drip irrigation systems. See MODEL AcT §
501.
21. See discussion of this case In Gregory A. Thomas.
Conseiving Aquallc B!diraity: A Cfilcal Comparison cf Legal Tc.s for
Augmntilng Stream Fbn In Ca ,oarna 15 Eawr'L. L 3 (1996).
22. DWR. supra note 12. at 221-222. See also. FmL REpor.
supra note 16, at 21.
23. M,-Eca':i V M STo Z D =cr. THE Awn-EvsO:u
W/ATE STORAS Dscr W'AmE RESOURCES MA ACe!Aifl PpociAm'.
(May 1993).
24. See City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando. 14 Cal.
3d 199, 260-261 (1975).
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The fundamental question is whether the return
flow and deep percolation of imported water can also
be salvaged for transfer in cases where the secondary
users do not pay a share of the cost of importation.
Stated another way, the question is whether water
transfer policy should recognize a distinction
between the transferability of salvaged "surface water
depending on whether it is native or imported and, if
imported, whether the secondary user pays part of
the cost of importation? Under this distinction,
where a local water agency or grower takes steps to
reduce the deep percolation or return flow of import-
ed water, that salvaged water would be transferrable
irrespective of the effect on "free-rider" secondary
users. The transferability would depend only on a
showing that surface water applications or con-
veyance losses were reduced through measures
implemented by the transferor and that the source of
the imported water is hydrologically disconnected
from the groundwater basin.
NHI recommends that the law create a rebut-
table presumption, as outlined above, where the
water is supplied by the state and federal water pro-
jects and where district members pay the district
nothing for groundwater recharge. We further rec-
ommend that all surface water applied in the area
declared by the San Joaquin Valley Drainage
Program to be a "drainage impacted area" enjoy a
presumption that deep percolation does not return
to usable groundwater, thus allowing water efficien-
cy improvements to generate transferable water.
This approach would not deprive "free-rider"
groundwater users of the recharge water on which
they have historically relied. However, it would
require them to pay for it in market transactions
instead of receiving it as a free good. This change
would benefit the growers and urban users who can
afford to pay market rates for water, but would disad-
vantage farmers who rely exclusively on groundwater
within the CVP service area. The net effect would be
to make much more water available for transfer than
under the Model Act (or the current regime) and
therefore would significantly lower the price. NHI
believes that this is a net social benefit, particularly
when combined with the next policy proposal.
We hasten to add, however, that secondary envi-
ronmental uses of imported water may have to be
treated differently than secondary consumptive uses.
Whereas it is reasonable to require profit-generating
uses, such as farms, to pay for their secondary uses of
25. MODEL AcT § 404(a)(2), (b)(2).
26. The provision would apply to sections 502 and 503 of
the Model Act. "Conserved" water is broadly defined by the
Model Act which creates a fundamental problem with the expe-
dited transfers under Part E. See MODEL AcT §§ 501. See discus-
imported water (which they now receive for free), the
same does not hold for the environment. Whatever
incidental benefit aquatic environments may receive
in the import area has usually been paid for at a high
environmental cost in the export area Thus, NHI sup-
ports the Model Act's provisions limiting the transfer
of "non-conserved" water to situations which would
not unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other
instream beneficial uses25 and contends that a similar
provision should protect the environment from trans-
fers of "conserved" water.26 Moreover. NHI finds short-
comings in the procedures for BoErd approval and
judicial review of water transfers. These shortcomings
are discussed below.
IV. Protecting Groundwater Resources
Whether or not recharge water is made eligible
for transfer, it is important that surface water trans-
fers not be allowed to contribute to groundwater
depletion. Where irrigators have access to both
ground and surface water, substitution between
them is automatic, routine and widespread 27 To
protect groundwater tables from additional deple-
tion, liberalized surface water transfer rules must
assure that out-of-basin surface water transfers do
not result in groundwater substitu:ion. This is par-
ticularly important if recharge water originating from
the CVP and SWP is made eligible for transfer, as it
should be. With this limitation, liberalized transfers
would not contribute to net groundwater depletion,
Therefore, we support the Model Act's provision
that surface water transfers in areas of critical over-
draft should not be permitted if the transferred sur-
face water is replaced with groundwater, except in
specified circumstances,28 and would broaden that
protection to cover all overdrafted aquifers so that
transfers do not exacerbate groundwater depletion.
We would also clarify this section to make clear that
groundwater substitution is not prohibited if part of
a conlunctive use program that is operated to ensure
no long term net depletion of groundwater
V. Expediting Approvals of Transfers
Perhaps the greatest encumbrance on a function-
ing water market is the multiple approval checkpoints
under California and federal reclamation law. These
particularly bedevil the very types of transfers with the
greatest potential to resolve the most serious water
sian infra Part V(C).
27. Personal communication to Gregory A Thomas,
Westlands Water District staff.
28. MODEL AcT § 208.
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reallocation needs of the state: that is, long-term or
permanent transfers across district boundanes for
new uses. Often, these are subject to at least three
approval processes: by the distnct of origin, by the
Bureau of Reclamation and by the Board.29 If water
transfers are to fulfill their potential for improving the
social benefits derivable from a limited water supply,
water transfer reforms must include an expedited
approval process for those categories of transfers that
pose no appreciable potential for adverse impacts on
other water users or the environment.
While acknowledging the importance of expe-
diting approvals, we fear that the Model Act sweeps
too broadly in its specification of the types of trans-
fers that would be eligible for fast-track treatment
and, by purporting to codify a detailed administra-
tive review process, may be overly pre-emptive of the
Board's prerogative and judgement on these inher-
ently administrative matters. We first summarize the
process reforms proposed in the Model Act, which
give us pause, and then suggest an alternative that
would entrust to the Board's rulemaking the specifi-
cation of the types of transfers that would be eligible
for summary approval, as well as the appropriate
process for doing so, under objectives and criteria
that would be enshrined in the water code.
A. The California Environmental Quality Act
One method by which the Model Act attempts
to expedite approval of water transfers is by exempt-
ing short-term transfers requiring Board approval
from the California Environrfiental Quality Act
(CEQA).30 Short term transfers (defined by the
Model Act as those whose term is two years or
less3i) are already exempt from the requirement for
preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR)
under CEQA if they are environmentally benign.
However, since any change in the water regime may
result in some localized reduction in flows, we sug-
gest a more practical test for EIR exemption than
avoidance of any significant environmental impact.
NHI believes that transfers eligible for expedited
29. CVPIA section 3405(a) states that:
All transfers to Central Valley Project waterauthonzed by
this subsection shall be subject to review and approval
by the Secretary under the conditions specified in this
subsection. Transfers involving more than 20 percent of
the Central Valley Project water subiect to long-term
contract within any contracting district or agency shall
also be subject to review and approval by such district or
agency under the conditions specified in this subsec-
tion...
CVPIA, Pub. L. No. 102-575. § 3405(a). 106 Stat. 460 (1992).
California Water Code section 1727 requires that the State Board,
upon receipt of notification of a proposed temporary change In
point of diversion, place of use. or purpose of use. make an eval-
uation sufficient to determine that the proposed change would
approval should be confined to those that produce a
net environmental benefit. Thus, no EIR would be
required if the initial evaluation under CEQA estab-
lishes that the transfer will result in a net environ-
mental benefit, in which event the transfer should be
entitled to a mitigated negative declaration. The
Model Act does not include this important qualifica-
tion on eligibility for EIR exemption. 32 One way to
assure net environmental benefit is by creating an
impact mitigation fund financed by recapturing
excess profits from water transfers. If established, as
proposed by NHI below, this device could automati-
cally satisfy the net benefit test and, hence, exempt
the transfer from the EIR requirement.
B. General Standards and Procedures Governing
Water Transfers under Part D
Part D of the Model Act sets forth the general
procedures governing the Board's review and
approval of water transfers.33 This Part substantially
expedites the %,ater transfer approval process for all
transfers, both short term and long term. The
approval procedures are strictly compressed, and
only parties that file a timely protest will be heard.
If this streamlined process is to ensure that all
interested parties will have an opportunity to be
heard, it is imperative that the notification proce-
dure be ample. Publication in one local newspaper
and issuance of a general notice by the Board is not
sufficient. At a minimum, the Board should be
required to maintain a list of potentially interested
parties and require the transferor to provide initial
written notice to these parties. Thereafter, service
should be required only on those who file a notice
of intent to participate.
The Model Act restricts standing to protest a
proposed transfer to 'vater users that may be
affected by the proposed transfer and other inter-
ested parties." without specifying that environmen-
tal organizations qualify as "interested parties."34 If
environmental organizations do not have standing
to file a protest, this would have very serious impli-
not inlure any legal user of the water, and that it would not unrea-
sonably affect fish. wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses. CA..
VATE Come § 1727 (West 1996). A similar requirement is mandat-
ed by section 1736, upon petitions for long-term transfers. Id. §
1736. Notably, State law under Water Code sections 1726 and
1736 also requires that the Department of Fish and Game be noti-
fied of a proposed change for both temporary or long-term water
transfers. Id. § 1726, 1736. This frequently will add yet a fourth
layer of administrative review to the approval process.
30. MnoD AcT 209.
31. Id. § 204.
32. Set genera l i, § 209.
33. Ste gntra il L1. § 401-406.
34. Id. § 403(d).
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cations since the Model Act only requires the Board
to give notice and an opportunity to be heard to
protestants, and only protestants are permitted to
seek ludicial review of the Board's decision to
approve or deny a transfer.35
While we are sympathetic to the need to
streamline the transfer approval process, in many
cases the time periods within which the Board must
review and approve a transfer under the Model Act
may prove to be unreasonably short. For short term
transfers, the Board must complete its investigation
and prepare a written analysis of the proposed
transfer no later than thirty days after the investiga-
tion is commenced. 36 For long term transfers, this
review and analysis must be completed within nine-
ty days.37 These time periods may prove insufficient
for the Board to complete an adequate and com-
prehensive investigation and written analysis of
complex transactions which may have many interre-
lated and potentially adverse impacts on other
water users and the environment.
With respect to short term transfers (which are
exempt from CEQA review under the Model Act: 8),
the short time period for Board investigation is par-
ticularly problematic, since this is the only time
such transfers will be subject to any environmental
analysis at all. With respect to long term transfers
(which are not exempt from CEQA review under the
act 39), the unreasonably short time period for Board
review of transfers is inconsistent with that statute,
since it will often be impossible for the CEQA
process to be completed within the ninety day time
period, even if only a negative declaration is pre-
pared. Unrealistically short processing periods are
likely to give short shrift to the environmental con-
sequences of proposed transfers.
Moreover, petitioners are only given twenty
days to respond to the Board's analysis of the pro-
posed transfer.40 Only parties who have filed written
protests are permitted to comment.41 The Board
must hold a hearing on a long term transfer petition
within thirty days of completing its analysis; no
hearing need be held on short term transfer pro-
posals. 42 Lastly, the Board is given only twenty or
thirty days, respectively, to render a decision on a
proposed short term or long term transfer.43 These
time frames are unrealistic for proper public review
of a transfer petition. And, it is unclear, particularly
in light of the extremely expedited process for trans-
fers of "conserved" water (see below), why it is nec-
essary to streamline the review and approval
process for all other transfers to this degree.
The standards by which the Board must review
and approve a proposed transfer might insufficiently
protect the environment. For short term transfers,
the Board must approve a proposed I ransfer unless it
finds the transfer would result in significant injury to
any legal water user or would unreasonably affect
fish, wildlife or other instream beneficial uses.
Moreover, the petitioner only has the burden of pro-
ducing prima facie evidence that the proposed trans-
fer would comply with these standards. Thereafter,
the burden of proof shifts to any petitioner to prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the transfer
would violate the above standards.
44
C. Standards and Procedures for Specially
Expedited Transfers of "Conserved" Water
under Part E
Part E of the Model Act establishes an even
more expedited process for review and approval of
transfers of "conserved" water,45 Under the Part E
procedures, a transferor need only file a notice of
intent to transfer and a declaration verifying the
water transfer quantities with the Board. For water
conserved through changes in acreage or type of
crop irrigated, the calculations must be made in
accordance with a statutorily-prescribed table
rather than hydrologic analysis in the field.46 Within
thirty days, the Board must approve the proposed
transfer if the transferor's calculations of the pro-
posed quantity of water to be transferred are accu-
rate.47 If the Board fails to act on a oroposed trans-
fer of conserved water within thirty days, it shall be
deemed approved. 48 Finally, although any "interest-
ed party" (again, this term is not defined) may sub-
mit written comments on the propo5ed transfer, the
Model Act contains no requirement or authority for
the Board to consider them.49 In fact, the Board has
no power to deny a proposed transfer on environ-
mental (or any other) grounds. The only types of
transfers expressly excluded from this part are long-
35. See generally id. §§ 401-406.
36. Id. § 403(e). The investigation must be commenced within
ten days of the Board's receipt of a transfer petition. See id. § 403(c).
37. Id. § 403(e).
38. Id. § 209.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 403(f).
41. Id.
42. Id. §§ 403(g)-(h).
43. Id. § 403(h).
44. Id. § 404(a).
45. See generally id. § 501-507.
46. Id. § 503(a).
47. Id. §§ 504(d)-(e).
48. Id. § 504(f).
49. Id. § 504(c).
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term transfers of conserved water based upon land
fallowing or retirement, which most undergo the
relatively more rigorous procedures in Part D. Thus,
under the Model Act, most water transfer transac-
tions will be subject to almost no analysis, mitiga-
tion and public comment at all.
If "conserved water" is confined to water that
does not otherwise return to beneficial use, includ-
ing environmental uses, and to transfers that confer
a net environmental benefit, as NHI has recom-
mended, then, bydefinition. no party can be harmed
by the salvage and transfer of that water.50 This limi-
tation must be patent, however, for quite commonly
wetlands and instream flows depend upon water
that is over-applied for irrigation. Establishing that
the "conserved" water is not available for subse-
quent beneficial uses must be a sine qua non of eli-
gibility for expedited approval. The fundamental
problem is that the definition of "conserved water"
in the Model Act is not so delimited. It would be far
better to confine the category of transfers eligible for
expedited treatment to those that do not jeopardize
legitimate competing interests than to jeopardize
the effort to streamline the approval process by
attempting to sweep too broadly.
Finally, under the Part E process for transfers of
conserved water, only the transferor is entitled to judi-
cial review of the Board's decision."1 Standing to seek
review should also be accorded to environmental
interests, or alternatively, the right to compensation
should be extended to environmental interests.52
D. NHI's Proposal
In contrast to the approach of the Model Act,
NHI suggests that the water code command the
Board to exercise its rulemaking authority to devel-
op a fast-track approval process, under criteria codi-
fied by the statute.53 The Board would determine
which categories of transfers are sufficiently innocu-
ous from the standpoint of protected legal interests
(including the environment) to be eligible for expe-
dited approvals, including exemption from CEQA.
NHI suggests that the statutory criteria confine
expedited transfers to environmental water transfers
50. The Act defines 'conserved water" to include water con-
-served changes in acreage or type of crops irmgated, land fallow-
ing or retirement, changes in operations, substitution of
redaimed water, pncing changes and other conservation mea-
sures. MODEL Acij 50 1.
51. MODEL Acr § 504(h).
52. See id. § 504(i).
53. We assume that by conferring fast-track approval
authority, the water code would not change or enlarge the juris-
diction of the Board over. for example, pre-1914 or (adjudicated)
riparian water rights. However. transfers by such water rights
holders may be authorized to avail themselves of the CEQA
exemption if the proposed transaction otherwise satisfied fast-
under section 1707 of the W'ater Code and transfers
that confer a net benefit on the aquatic environ-
ment.54 This could be accomplished through an
environmental restoration or mitigation fee that
would allow the net environmental benefits to be
achieved through the operation of the water market.
For instance, water might be purchased for areas
with inadequate streamflows through an impact
compensation fund, described infra, in Section VI.
The Board rules would also prescribe the -fast-
track" approval process for those eligible categories of
transfers. For these transfers, the Board would deter-
mine which type of hearing, if any, would be conduct-
ed, what kind of environmental documentation will
be required, what manner of protest will be permit-
ted, and how burdens of proof would be allocated.
VI. Third Party Economic Impacts
Section 404(c)of the Model Act is potentially
quite troublesome. Disallowing long-term transfers
based on land fallowing that would cause -substan-
tial harm" to the local economy might be highly
inhibitory of the very type of transfers that public
policy should be encouraging. It is clear that the
water that should move out of agriculture to meet
other needs is the water that is being used least
productively in that sector. Fully 20% of the water
used in agnculture produces less than 5% of its
profits." This 20% would more than meet anticipat-
ed urban and environmental needs, such as the
delta inflow standards.' 6 NHI's research shows that
if this water is tapped, the economic costs of meet-
ing the new delta standards would be an order of
magnitude less than if that water is taken pro rata
out of existing agricultural uses. There are other
areas where land retirement may be very desirable
on environmental grounds, including the drainage
impacted area on the west side of the San loaquin
and delta agriculture. These low productivity crops
are largely found in particular pockets in California.
In short, uneven impacts on local agriculture are
both a likely and desirable result of a functioning
water market.
track approval requirements.
54. See CAL WATER CODE § 1707 (West 1996).
55. Sunding. et al. The Costs of Reallocating Water from
Agriculture. 6 (July 1994) (unpublished research paper prepared
under a cooperative agreement with the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency).
56. The water supply impacts of the 1995 water quality con-
trol plan were estimated in the environmental impact report at
approximately 400,000 acre-feet as an annual average and up to 1.1
million acre-feet in critically dry years. Ser Sw'E w,cER Rscu cEs
CO OL BOEAR. REr or. AChpecix I To %,ATE.R o1u
COMTOL PLOW FRo THE S~n Fmncisco BmrSi *.izrro-sA~n jOAOu,1.
DaI3A EstuiAn. Chapter Vil (May 1995).
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The problem with meeting unmet water needs is
that the water is already tied up in a vested rights sys-
tem. The solution is to encourage water to move from
existing beneficiaries to new ones, not to create addi-
tional rigidities. Granting local economies something in
the nature of a vested right to retain water now used
there is the opposite of the direction the state should go.
Rather than freezing agricultural water use into
its existing pattern, as section 404 would do, it
would be far more preferable to provide an impact
compensation scheme. The Model Act's scheme
and NHI's alternative proposals are discussed in the
next sections.
VII. Third Party and Environmental Compensation
and Mitigation
The Model Act features a $5.00 per acre foot
"security deposit" on transfers of conserved water to
be placed into an environmental and third party
compensation fund.57 NHI has proposed an alterna-
tive scheme for endowing the compensation fund
and for its use. We favor creating an impact com-
pensation fund by "recapturing" the excess profits
when and where they accrue in water transfers.
Profits may be regarded as excessive when the dif-
ferential between the cost of water (including the
cost of conserving or salvaging it) to the seller and
the sales price less the "transaction costs" exceeds
the level necessary to motivate the transfer. This can
be ascertained by analyzing the value of that same
block of water in other applications. The potential
for excessive profits in water transfers is substantial
in light of the facts that: (1) water is appropriated
without payment to its original owner, the people of
the state; (2) water is often delivered at highly-sub-
sidized rates; and (3) large needs for water within
the state remain unmet. If these excess profits were
recaptured progressively (i.e., the percentage recap-
tured increases as the profit increases above a spec-
ified threshold) marginally profitable transfers
would not be encumbered by a security assessment.
Yet, the potential fund that could be created for
impact mitigation and environmental restoration
might be quite appreciable over time.
We would also suggest that the fund not be
treated as a "security" fund where compensation
would be limited to the amount collected as part of
that particular transaction, but rather as an insur-
ance fund that would compensate the full amount
of "damage" caused to either the environment or
57. MODEL AcT § 505.
58. Note that § 505 of the Model Act does not exempt envi-
ronmental transfers from the assessment of a security deposit. The
Model Act also fails to specify in § 506 that parties contracting for
other third party interests (limited in the case of
economic injury as per section 506(b)(2) and further
limited to transactional assistance) Environmental
water transfers should not be subject to the profit
recapture because this use of water does not lead to
environmental impacts that need to be mitigated
and is not revenue generating.58 The profits recap-
tured should be remitted to a non-governmental
custodian to avoid the possibility of being diverted
to the general fund by the legislature through its
appropriation processes. Environmental water
transfers should not be subject to a security deposit
(see discussion supra), nor should they be subject
to an excess profit recovery scheme.
VIII. Transfers of Water to Instream Uses
NHI supports the provisions o the Model Act
concerning transfers to instream flows. We are par-
ticularly encouraged by the inclusion of a cumula-
tive flow provision which helps ensure that such
dedications will in fact be "wet" water; in other
words, that water transferred to instream flow will
not just serve to alleviate the pre-existing instream
flow obligations of other water users. Without such
a provision, the incentive to transfer water to
instream flow is greatly reduced, since, instead of
improving the status quo, such transfers simply
substitute for current regulatory obligations,59
However, we believe that the Model Act could
provide even greater protection to voluntary dedica-
tions to instream flow through the simple and high-
ly cost-effective device of an "instream flow reg-
istry." This computer database would be established
and maintained by the Board. It would track all vol-
untary dedications and regulato-y reservations
applicable to a given stream segment in a cumula-
tive manner, unless the parties to a particular trans-
fer agreement expressly state their intention to use
the transferred water to satisfy pre-existing regula-
tory obligations. The registry would thus ensure
that environmental water transfers are truly additive
to flows otherwise required by regulatory actions, In
addition, the registry would make all instream flow
reservations and dedications transparent so that all
affected interests would know how much water is
required to flow past particular diversion points and
measuring stations at a given time. The net effect of
this arrangement will be to encourage voluntary
water transfers to instream flow, which will result in
a substantial economic savings to the state.
environmental water transfers are entitled to file claims for com-
pensation when that interest is Injured. These sections should be
amended to eliminate these problems. See Id. ,§ 505, 506.
59. Thomas, supra note 2 1.
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We therefore strongly recommend that the
Model Act be amended to include provisions estab-
lishing such an instream flow registry. For the past
three years, NHI has sponsored legislation to codi-
fy the instream flow registry concept, 60 which has
been co-sponsored by the Metropolitan Water
District and the Association of California Water
Agencies. This legislation could be used as a tem-
plate for similar provisions in the Model Act.
In addition, the Model Act fails to specify when
and whether Water Code section 1707 changes are
included within the term "water transfer." This cre-
ates serious ambiguities in that with section 1707
approvals, the underlying water right is not. trans-
ferred. 6i Rather, a change in use is effected.
Clarification on this point would be desirable
throughout the Model Act.62
IX. Through Delta Transfers
The Model Act provides that no transfer of
water through the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta
shall cause a violation of state and federal water
quality standards.63 It further requires the Board to
promulgate regulations to implement this section
within 180 days of the effective date of the Model
Act." Finally, as part of this rulemaking, section 206
authorizes the Board to require through-Delta
transfers to include carriage water.65
180 days is insufficient time within which to pro-
mulgate regulations adequate to protect Delta water
quality standards. Section 206 itself requires the
Board to consult with the California Department of
Water Resources, California Department of Fish and
Game, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service. National Marine Fisheries Service,
and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency." In
addition, the Model Act requires the regulations to
be peer-reviewed by academic experts in the fields of
hydrology, marine biology, water supply engineering,
water quality, water rights, and related disciplines. 67
Further, such regulations must undergo review pur-
suant to the California Environmental Quality Act
and the Administrative Procedures Act.6" All of this
cannot possibly be accomplished in six months.
NHI recommends that the regulations assure
that transfers through the delta in all cases result in
a net environmental benefit. The Board could
implement that oblective by promulgating a table
that specifies the additional amount of carriage
water that must accompany each transfer within or
through the Delta for various hydrologic conditions
and types of water transfers.
X. Conclusion
Water transfers have great potential as a mech-
anism for expanding beneficial use, reallocating
limited supply, and improving the efficiency and
productivity of water use. As California's population
grows and water becomes an increasingly scarce
resource, voluntary water markets must play a more
prominent role in meeting the state's changing
water supply needs. Beginning in 1979. the
California Legislature enacted a series of statutes
specifically directed at facilitating voluntary market
transfers of water on a regional and statewide basis.
These reforms narrowly focused on changes to the
common law.and statutory rules defining transfer-
able interests in water, but failed to establish a
functional water market. Relatively speaking, few
interregional market reallocations have occurred in
California, especially considering the sheer volume
of water used and transported in the state. The bulk
of the state's water supply remains tied to a legacy
of "first in time is first in nght.; with large blocks
dedicated to inefficient and often environmentally
damaging uses. The result is that in drier years,
other needs, arguably more valuable from a social
and economic standpoint, frequently go unmet.
The Model Water Transfer Act represents an
important step in the states evolutionary progress
toward a more effective water market. Its provisions
would improve incrementally on the existing transfer
regime, chipping away at several of the legal bramers
which have traditionally stifled market transactions.
The protection it provides groundwater resources
and the assurance it would bnng to environmental
dedications represent important advancements in
the development of sustainable transfer policy.
Ultimately, however, the Model Act sweeps too
broadly in its efforts to streamline approval proce-
dures. By effectively removing important third-party
protections, the Act unnecessarily compromises
environmental and other public values. The Act also
ignores potential actions which could ameliorate
some of the more subtle but challenging obstacles to
transfer activity. This would include an incentive
60. Currently. the bill is AB 1533 (Cortese). introduced in the
1995 Legislative Session.
6 1. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1707 (West 1996).
62. See. e.g., the Water Registry Provision of the Model Act.





68. CAL. PuE. Rrs. CODE 4421000-21172 (west 1996).
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structure encouraging user-initiated transfers and
enhancing the role of water districts in the move-
ment of water across district boundaries. The same
applies to the impediment that arises at the interface
of surface water transfers and groundwater manage-
ment in California. Until the consumptive use limita-
tion is revisited to better reflect principles of natural
law and changing social values, a large portion of the
developed water supply will remain outside the
transfer market. In our view, these and other hurdles
must be overcome before a functional water market
can take hold. But as pointed out earlier, previous
efforts stalled attempting a more comprehensive set
of reforms, and perhaps incremental progress is the
more prudent course. In any event, it is here that the
Model Act holds its greatest value. It maintains
momentum on positive transfer reform, while posit-
ing a sound initial framework from which an active
market might operate.
